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The  question  of  central  bank  independence  is  one  of  degree. 
A  completely  independent  central  bank  is  impossible  as  long  as  a 
country  has  provisions  for  altering  central  bank  powers,  even  if 
that  requires  constitutional  amendments.  On  the  other  hand,  any 
central  bank  has  at  least  some  discretion  in monetary  policy 
unless  it  is  either  in  the  pocket  of  a dictator  or  required  by 
mandate  to  follow  a mechanical  rule,  such  as  the  central  bank  in 
Argentina  where  monetary  policy  is  effectively  determined  by  the 
currency  board. 
In  the  United  States  and  many  other  countries,  people 
question  the  degree  of  central  bank  independence,  often  citing 
the  need  to  better  insulate  central  bankers  from  pressure  to 
serve  either  the  political  motives  of  government  officials  or  the 
financial  interests  of  private  individuals  and  organizations. 
This  school  of  thought  argues  that  the  central  bank  should  be 
left  alone  to  pursue  one  monetary  policy  goal:  price  stability. 
It  is  feared  that  either  government  officials  with  too  much 
influence  over  central  bankers  or  laws  setting  inappropriate 
priorities  for  them  undermine  this  independence. 
The  Federal  Reserve  already  enjoys  a good  measure  of 
independence,  but  many  observers  believe  that  it  should  have 
more.  In particular,  the  advocates  of  greater  Federal  Reserve 
independence  support  reducing  the  statutory  encumbrances  on  the 
2 Fed,  especially  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act.'  2 
But  problems  arise.  First,  allowing  an  independent  group  of 
men  and  women  to weigh  tradeoffs  and  make  choices  that  deeply 
affect  the  lives  of  the  citizenry  is  antithetical  to  democracy 
when  some  of  them,  the  regional  Federal  Reserve  Bank  presidents 
who  serve  on  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee,  are  appointed  by 
boards  of  directors  who  are  largely  elected  by  bankers,  not 
citizens.  Second,  the  criteria  applied  as  Federal  Reserve 
Governors  are  appointed  by  the  president  and  confirmed  by 
Congress  are  much  narrower  than  the  range  of  issues  affected  by 
monetary  policy.  The  president  and  Congress  evaluate  potential 
governors  as  if  they  were  merely  custodians  of  price  stability, 
general  economic  growth,  and  the  financial  system  when  in 
reality,  to  an  extent  probably  not  realized  by  most  elected 
officials,  they  make  decisions  that  directly  or  indirectly  alter 
public  policy  on  a vast  array  of  important  issues,  as  we  will  see 
later.  The  questioning  at  confirmation  hearings  does  not  reflect 
' For  example,  Senator  Connie  Mack,  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Economic  Committee,  has  been  outspoken  in  support  of  a narrow 
objective  for  the  Federal  Reserve's  monetary  policy:  keep 
inflation  at  zero.  See  Berry,  John  M.  "Giving  the  Fed  a One- 
track  Mind,"  Washinston  Post,  21  September  1995. 
2 The  1978  Full  Employment  and  Balanced  Growth  Act  (also 
known  as  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act)  stipulates  that  the  nation's 
economic  policymakers  should  strive  to  accomplish  the  following 
objectives:  full  employment,  increased  real  incomes,  balanced 
growth,  a balanced  federal  budget,  growth  in  productivity,  an 
improved  balance  of  trade  and  price  stability.  The  Act  requires 
the  Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  to  explain  before  Congress 
twice  a year  how  the  Fed's  policies  are  consistent  with  the  goals 
outlined  above.  [Source:  Kliesen,  Kevin.  "A Fed  Focused  on  Price 
Stability,"  Regional  Economist,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Saint 
Louis,  April  1995.1 this  breadth. 
An  independent  central  bank  can  be  consistent  with  democracy 
only  if  two  requirements  are  met: 
1.  Monetary  policy  actions  have  narrow  consequences;  they 
affect  price  stability  and  the  soundness  of  the  financial  system 
but  do  not  involve  social  tradeoffs.  An  independent  central  bank 
must  not  be  able  to  influence  unemployment  or  other  important 
aspects  of  the  economy.  Otherwise,  if  the  Fed  rather  than  duly 
elected  officials  chooses  among  various  combinations  of 
unemployment,  inflation,  and  growth,  it  is violating  democratic 
principles.  Thus,  not  surprisingly,  most  central  bankers  and 
other  advocates  of  independence  argue  that  monetary  policy  does 
not  affect  unemployment,  at  least  not  in  the  long  run.3 
2.  The  central  bank  has  a systematic,  objective  method  of 
selecting  the  right  policy  to meet  its  goal  of  a  stable  currency 
and  a healthy  financial  sector.  If  the  central  bank  can  only 
pursue  arbitrary,  subjective  policies,  how  will  the  removal  of 
congressional  and  presidential  influences  improve  its 
performance?  On  the  contrary,  if  central  bankers  are  largely 
playing  a guessing  game  with  enormous  stakes,  Congress  and/or  the 
White  House  should  be  readily  able  to  prevent  dangerous  gambles. 
If,  for  example,  the  Fed  is  inclined  to  risk  a deep  recession  in 
an  effort  to  lower  inflation  from  2 
officials  may  not  feel  that  America 
5%  to  0,  our  elected 
should  take  that  chance. 
3 Tietmeyer,  Hans.  "Reducing  Unemployment:  Current  Issues 
and  Policy  Options,"  Kansas  City  Fed  Symposium,  August  25-27 
1994,  pp.  359-60. 
4 The  reality  is  that  neither  of  the  above  conditions  holds. 
Monetary  policy  has  a multitude  of  profound  effects  on  the  U.S. 
economy  and  society.  And  monetary  policy  formulation  is  far  from 
scientific  and  objective,  as  we  will  see  shortly. 
Therefore,  democracy  requires  that  central  bank  independence 
be  limited  so  that  the  makers  of  monetary  policy  cannot  stray  far 
from  the  will  of  the  people  as  embodied  in  their  duly  elected 
representatives.  Moreover,  central  bankers  must  be  held 
accountable  for  all  of  the  ramifications  of  their  policy,  not 
just  the  inflation  rate. 
One  might  ask  how  top  Federal  Reserve  governors  are 
different  from  other  appointed  public  servants,  who  are  also  a 
step  removed  from  the  electorate.  They  are  all  screened  before 
their  appointments  by  elected  officials,  given  finite  terms,  and 
can  be  impeached  for  gross  improprieties  or  negligence.  Yet 
there  are  differences.  First,  the  twelve  regional  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  presidents  also  wield  considerable  influence,  and 
they  are  more  representative  of  the  banking  industry  than  of  the 
American  people.  Second,  no  other  government  appointment 
carries  both  the  Federal  Reserve  governors'  high  degree  of 
independence  and  power  over  so many  controversial,  socially 
critical  issues. 
Supreme  Court  Justices  are  even  more  independent  and 
powerful  than  governors,  but  they  are  not  supposed  to  be 
concerned  with  the  will  of  the  people;  rather,  their 
responsibility  is  to  represent  and  protect  the  U.S.  Constitution 
5 against,  among  other  things,  the  "tyranny  of  the  majority". 
Cabinet  Secretaries  and  many  other  powerful  appointees  are 
directly  controlled  by  the  President.  Top  regulators,  such  as 
the  head  of  the  Security  and  Exchange  Commission,  have  legitimate 
claim  to  independence,  for  they  are  better  described  as  referees 
enforcing  rules  than  as  policy  makers. 
Federal  Reserve  governors  are  in  part  regulators,  and  in 
such  roles  should  enjoy  considerable  independence,  but  they  also 
make  monumental  policy  choices  for  the  nation,  choices  that 
should  be  democratically  determined.  Reducing  the  accountability 
of  those  making  these  decisions  would  be  a  step  in  the  wrong 
direction. 
Instead 
Reserve  more 
should  make 
required  to 
of  monetary 
of  the  United  States  government  giving  the  Federal 
independence  and  a narrower  set  of  objectives,  it 
zhe  Fed  more  accountable.  The  central  bank  should  be 
justify  its  actions  in view  of  all  the  implications 
?olicy.4  Congress  and  the  White  House  should  have 
greater  control  over  the  social  and  economic  choices  implicit  iI 
monetary  policy  in  order  to  make  sure  that  the  policy  reflects 
the  desires  of  the  American  people. 
This  discussion  focuses  on  the  United  States,  but  most  of 
the  arguments  could  be  applied  to  any  economically  advanced 
country. 
4 Numerous  economists  have  argued  for  greater  Fed 
accountability.  See  for  example,  Galbraith,  James  K.  "A Two-track 
Growth  Program,"  Challenge,  January-February  1993. 
6 Monetary  Policy  and  Employment 
In  the  real  world,  monetary  policy  cannot  restrain  inflation 
without  weakening  the  economy  and  curbing  employment.  This  is  in 
direct  contrast  to  the  effects  of  monetary  policy  in  the  purely 
theoretical,  idealized  world  in which  the  economic  actors, 
including  workers,  managers,  consumers,  entrepreneurs,  and 
investors,  are  all-knowing  and  thus  recognize  subtle  changes  in 
market  conditions  virtually  instantaneously.  In  this  theoretical 
world,  labor  markets  adjust  wages  and  product  markets  adjust 
prices  as  soon  as  higher  interest  rates  slow  the  economy  and  the 
demand  for  workers;  these  effects  occur  so promptly  that 
unemployment  never  has  a  chance  to  rise  significantly  nor  output 
to  fall.  In  reality,  it  takes  time  for  the  economic  actors  to 
recognize  changes  in market  conditions,  and,  if  the  changes  are 
small,  people  may  be  oblivious  to  them  for  some  time.  They  may 
go  into  denial,  refusing  to  believe  that  they  cannot  get  the  pay 
or  prices  they  expected.  They  may  hold  out,  anticipating  that 
conditions  will  soon  pick  up  again.  And  contrary  to  the  model 
of  the  rational  decision-maker,  sometimes  people  may  be 
indignant,  stubborn,  or  otherwise  irrational. 
Let's  consider  real-world  inflation.  What  happens  when 
sellers  raise  prices?  Either  they  increase  their  profit  margins 
or  they  protect  margins  after  an  increase  in  costs.  Thus,  the 
two  basic  types  of  inflation  are  widening  profit  margins  and 
increasing  business  costs.  To  stem  inflation,  a  tightening  of 
monetary  policy  must  succeed  in  compressing  profit  margins  and/or 
7 limiting  cost  increases.  It  does  both,  but  not  without 
curtailing  employment. 
Rising  unemployment  is  the  Federal  Reserve's  primary  means 
of  fighting  business  cost  inflation,  and  increased  joblessness  is 
an  inexorable  consequence  of  squeezing  profit  margins.  Monetary 
policy  reduces  business  cost  inflation  primarily  by  curtailing 
advances  in  labor  costs,  which  are  by  far  the  largest  and  most 
important  of  all  business  costs.  In  the  idealized  world  of 
orthodox  economic  theory,  the  Federal  Reserve  can  fine-tune 
inflation  since  nearly  perfect  markets  work  so well  that  a  small 
reduction  in  the  pace  of  monetary  growth  slows  the  pace  of  wage 
and  salary  increases,  and  all  the  while  equilibrium  forces 
prevent  the  economy  from  straying  far  from  full  employment.  In 
reality,  the  only  way  that  Fed  rate  hikes  can  influence  the  size 
of  pay  increases  is  by  hindering  economic  activity  sufficiently 
to  cause  a marked  increase  in  unemployment  and  a decrease  in  job 
security.  If  high  interest  rates  slow  business  at  General 
Motors,  the  company  will  lay  off  workers  long  before  it 
renegotiates  compensation  rates. 
The  influence  of  monetary  policy  on  other  business  costs  is 
mixed  and  has  much  less  impact  on  inflation.  For  example, 
Federal  Reserve  rate  hikes  tend  to  strengthen  the  dollar  and 
lower  the  cost  of  imported  goods,  but  they  also  increase 
business'  interest  expenses  since  the  business  sector  is  a net 
interest  payer. 
Profit  margins  account  for  only  a  small  fraction  of  prices, 
8 but  abrupt  changes  in profitability  can  make  substantial  if  brief 
contributions  to  general  inflation.  Also,  stable  but  excessively 
high  profits  can  lead  to  labor  and  other  shortages,  causing  firms 
to  bid  up  employee  compensation  rates. 
By  raising  interest  rates,  the  Fed  can 
margins.  The  relationships  among  the  terms 
compress  profit 
in  the  profit 
identity  (Figure  1)  are  not  purely  one-directional  or  simple,  but 
in  the  short  term  (periods  of  three  months  or  less)  the  dominant 
dynamic  is  that  profits  are  largely  the  dependent  variable 
determined  by  the  other,  relatively  independent  variables.5 
Rising  interest  rates  affect  virtually  all  the  terms  on  the  right 
side  of  the  equation  and  therefore  affect  total  profits.  The 
most  important  effect  is  through  investment;  rising  interest 
rates  eventually  reduce  investment  and  therefore  profits. 
However,  since  Fed  interest  rate  hikes  affect  profits  in  complex 
ways  through  many  variables,  monetary  policy  is  a highly 
imprecise  tool  for  regulating  profit  margins. 
Since  profits  typically  account  for  about  10%  of  prices,' 
Fed  policy  must  reduce  profit  margins  by  10%  to  offset  one 
5 Asimakopoulos,  A.  "The  Determinants  of  Profits:  United 
States,  1950-88",  in  Papadimitriou,  Dimitri  B.  (ed.),  Profits, 
Deficits  and  Instability,  Macmillan  (1992) 
Levy,  S Jay  and  Levy,  David  A.  Profits  and  the  Future  of 
American  Society,  Harper  & Row  (1983). 
6 National  Income  and  Product  Accounts,  profits  before  tax 
for  domestic  corporations.  These  aggregate  profit  margins  are 
larger  than  the  average  for  individual  corporations  because  the 
profits  on  sales  of  business  services,  crude/intermediate  goods, 
and  wholesale  finished  goods  are  embedded  in  the  costs  of  final 
goods  and  services  sold. 
9 percentage  point  of  inflation.  Such  a  decline  would  represent  a 
notable  deterioration  in  the  business  climate  and  would  have  a 
significant  impact  on  employment. 
It  is  sometimes  argued  that  Fed  actions  lower  inflationary 
expectations  without  applying  the  brakes  to  economic  growth  and 
job  creation.  As  soon  as  monetary  policy  becomes  tighter, 
workers  and  employers  both  lower  their  assessments  of  inflation 
and,  therefore,  appropriate  wage  rates.  Simultaneously, 
consumers  see  less  justification  for  price  increases  and  firms 
anticipate  that  they  will  have  smaller  cost  increases  to  pass  on. 
The  expectation  of  lower  inflation  is  thus  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
But  there  is  a huge  problem  with  this  theory.  Almost  no  one 
forms  inflation  expectations  based  on  what  the  Federal  Reserve 
does,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  financial  markets.  The 
financial  markets  are  certainly  highly  sensitive  to  Fed  actions 
--  often  to  vague  hints  by  Federal  Reserve  officials  about  future 
actions  --  as  reflected  in  the  bond  market.  But  do  markets 
respond  because  their  inflation  expectations  change  or  merely 
because  their  expectations  of  future  Fed  interest  rate  policy 
changes?  Bonds  often  sell  off  when  the  monetary  policy  is 
tightening  or  appears  likely  to  tighten,  as  during  much  of  1994. 
Similarly,  bonds  often  rally  when  the  Fed  eases  or  when  the 
market  perceives  an  increasing  chance  of  easing.  At  best,  the 
case  that  markets  lower  inflation  expectations  when  the  Federal 
Reserve  tightens  policy  is  questionable. 
10 Regardless  of  how  or  why  the  credit  markets  respond  to 
changes  in monetary  policy,  their  effect  on  the  overall  economy 
is  only  through  changes  in  the  cost  of  capital.  The  markets  may 
accentuate  or  dampen  the  Federal  Reserve's  efforts  to  raise  the 
cost  of  capital,  but  they  have  no  other  effects  on  business  costs 
or  profit  margins.  The  great  bulk  of  decisions  affecting 
inflation  are  made  by  firms,  workers,  and  consumers.  Certainly, 
inflation  expectations  affect  compensation  negotiations,  consumer 
decisions,  and  how  much  firms  are  willing  to  pay  for  goods  and 
services.  But  the  great  majority  of  these  decision  makers  are 
either  ignorant  of  Fed  policy  or  consider  it  too  abstract  for 
incorporation  when  formulating  inflation  expectations  based  on 
experience  in  their  markets.  Imagine  an  employee  or  union 
representative  reducing  the  size  of  the  pay  raise  he  or  she  is 
seeking  or  a  firm  that  lowering  prices  upon  hearing  the  news  that 
the  Federal  Reserve  has  tightened  monetary  policy! 
Thus,  the  Federal  Reserve  does  face  a  tradeoff  between 
unemployment  and  inflation,  at  least  in  the  short  run. 
Tightening  credit  combats  inflation  by  squeezing  profit  margins 
and  increasing  unemployment  -- by  weakening  the  economy.  To 
significantly  affect  prices,  the  Fed  must  engineer  a meaningful 
change  in  the  profits  trend  and  materially  soften  labor  markets. 
Many  economists  argue  that  such  short-term  effects  are 
transient  and  that  monetary  policy  will  not  affect  unemployment 
in  the  long-run.  Their  arguments  are  either  purely  theoretical 
--  the  economy  gravitates  to  full  employment  equilibrium 
11 regardless  of  monetary  policy  --  or  based  solely  on  the  empirical 
evidence  that  there  is  no  clear,  demonstrable,  long-run  Phillips 
curve.  But  the  theoretical  arguments  are  contested  on  numerous 
grounds,  and  the  empirical  ones  are  misapplied. 
The  failure  to  demonstrate  a  clear,  long-run  relationship 
between  inflation  and  unemployment  by  no  means  implies  that 
monetary  policy  has  no  long-run  effect  on  unemployment.  Indeed, 
many  central  bankers  and  economists  explicitly  recommend  using 
unemployment  as  a  long-term  price-stabilization  strategy.  They 
advocate  preventing  inflation  by  maintaining  adequate  "slack"  in 
the  economy  -- by  keeping  the  rate  of  capacity  utilization  below 
a  threshold  (usually  85%)  and  by  maintaining  a minimum  rate  of 
unemployment.  This  rate  is  the  unfortunately  named  "natural  rate 
of  unemployment,"  also  known  as  the  "nonaccelerating  inflation 
rate  of  unemployment  (NAIRU) 'I.  In  the  past  few  years,  NAIRU  in 
the  United  States  has  been  estimated  to  be  anywhere  from  5.5%  to 
6.5%,  although  recently  some  economists  are  making  downward 
revisions  in  their  estimates.7  Statements  by  Fed  officials 
during  the  period  of  rising  interest  rates  that  began  in  February 
of  1994  frequently  reflected  concern  about  tightening  labor 
markets,'  although  the  central  bankers  have  not  publicly 
7 The  unemployment  rate  broke  5.5%  in  December  of  1994 
without  evidence  of  a  significant  acceleration  in wage  trends. 
Some  economists  who  believe  in  the  NAIRU  concept,  such  as  Edmund 
Phelps  and  Robert  Gordon  have  been  lowering  their  estimates,  as 
noted  in  The  Wall  Street  Journal,  24  January  1995. 
a Robert  T.  Parry,  President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  San  Francisco  doubts  that  anyone  can 
pinpoint  the  precise  unemployment  rate  that  triggers  inflation, 
12 acknowledged  a  target  unemployment  rate  nor  explicitly  endorsed 
the  concept  of  NAIRU. 
Whatever  the  limitations  of  monetary  policy  for  controlling 
economic  activity,  the  Federal  Reserve  can  virtually  always  cause 
more  unemployment.  Moreover,  if  the  alleged  NAIRU  is  to  be  the 
lowest  unemployment  rate  tolerated  by  the  Fed--a  floor  for  the 
unemployment  rate--and  if  the  central  bank  is  successful  in 
keeping  the  unemployment  rate  above  the  NAIRU,  unemployment 
usually  be  well  above  NAIRU.  This  is because,  unless  the 
will 
business  cycle  is  eliminated,  the  unemployment  rate  will  move  up 
and  down  within  a  range.  The  average  unemployment  rate  will  be 
well  above  the  NAIRU  floor,  since  the  unemployment  rate 
vacillates  by  several  percentage  points  during  a  typical  business 
cycle.  For  example,  if NAIRU  is  assumed  to  be  6%  by  monetary 
policy  makers,  then  the  average  unemployment  rate  will  likely  be 
well  over  7%. 
Even  if  the  claim  that  monetary  policy  does  not  affect  long- 
run  unemployment  were  true,  serious  short-term  unemployment 
should  be  weighed  against  any  short-  or  long-term  reductions  in 
inflation.  And  that  is  a  trade-off  that  should  be  evaluated  by 
the  people's  elected  representatives,  not  just  by  appointees  who 
disproportionately  represent  the  financial  sector.  Moreover,  if 
the  long-run  relationship  between  unemployment  and  monetary 
but  he  suggested  it  lurks  somewhere  between  6%  and  6.5%,  and 
probably  "in  the  higher  part  of  that  range."  See  Los  Angeles 
Times,  1 June  1994. 
13 policy  is  uncertain,  then  elected  officials  should  have  the 
ultimate  say  on  what  risks  are  worth  taking. 
Monetary  Policy  and  Deficit  Reduction 
One  of  the  great  mysteries  of  our  time  is  how,  despite  the 
swelling  of  sentiment  for  deficit  reduction  that  has  come  to 
dominate  national  politics,  with  government  assailed  at  every 
turn  for  spending  the  taxpayers  deeper  and  deeper  into  debt,  one 
U.S.  agency,  the  Federal  Reserve,  lumps  tens  of  billions  of 
dollars  onto  the  annual  deficit  at  will  --  and  remains  virtually 
unscathed  by  criticism  for  the  fiscal  effects  of  its  actions. 
The  Fed  raised  interest  rates  seven  times  between  February 
4,  1994  and  January  31,  1995,  a  total  of  three  percentage  points. 
Was  there  a newspaper  headline  that  read  "Central  Bank  Raises 
Rates,  Adds  Billions  More  to  Federal  Deficit"  after  even  one  of 
those  occasions?  For  that  is precisely  what  the  Federal  Reserve 
did.  When  the  Fed  tightens  credit,  it widens  the  federal  deficit 
both  directly,  by  increasing  federal  interest  payments,  and 
indirectly,  by  reducing  tax  revenues  and  raising  economic 
assistance  outlays. 
The  impact  on  federal  interest  outlays  is  considerable.  In 
1995,  approximately  $1  trillion  of  federal  debt  is  being  either 
refinanced  or  created.  Adding  300  basis  points  to  the  interest 
rates  on  these  new  Treasury  securities  increases  the  annual  rate 
of  federal  interest  payments  by  about  $30  billion  within  a year. 
Moreover,  the  longer  interest  rates  remain  elevated,  the  greater 
14 will  be  the  share  of  Treasury  debt  affected  by  the  rate  hike. 
Thus  an  ongoing  anti-inflation  vigil  by  the  Fed  as  during  the 
1980s  has  a  long-term,  cumulative  effect  on  federal  interest 
payments.  Figure  2  shows  the  federal  government's  net  interest 
payments  as  a percentage  of  GDP.  The  steep  rise  in  the  late 
1970s  and  early  1980s  reflects  in  large  part  the  jump  in  interest 
rates  engineered  by  the  Fed.  The  decline  of  the  early  1990s 
despite  continued,  large  deficits  reflects  the  steep  1989-1992 
rate  decline. 
Moreover,  if  Fed  rate  hikes  keep  profits  10%  below  what  they 
would  otherwise  have  been,  the  government  loses  more  than  $15 
billion  in  corporate  income  tax  revenue  during  the  year.  If 
monetary  policy  reduces  the  annual  collection  of  personal  income 
and  social  security  taxes  by  1.5%  (which  would  be  consistent  with 
a marked  slowdown  but  not  a  recession),  the  government  deficit 
rises  by  about  $17  billion.  Add  a  few  billion  dollars  more  for 
unemployment  insurance  and  other  cyclical  outlays.  The  bottom 
line  is  that  tight  money  policies  that  are  potent  enough  to 
seriously  affect  price  trends  add  many  tens  of  billions  of 
dollars  to  deficit  spending  --  even  without  creating  a  recession. 
Monetary  Policy  and  the  Current  Account  Balance 
Repeated,  large  U.S.  trade  deficits  in  the  1980s  wiped  out 
America's  formerly  huge  net  holdings  of  foreign  assets.  In  1988, 
The  United  States  became  a net  debtor  country,  making  headlines 
and  provoking  much  hand-wringing.  Subsequently,  our 
15 international  balance  sheet  was  all  but  forgotten  by  most 
commentators,  and  the  trade  gap  made  headlines  only  as  a  "jobs" 
issue  until  the  dollar  began  to  drop  against  the  yen, 
deutschemark,  and  a handful  of  other  European  currencies  in  early 
1995.  Even  then,  the  falling  dollar  was  widely  viewed  as  the 
problem;  there  was  little  discussion  of  the  rise  in  U.S.  net 
international  debt. 
But  our  net  foreign  debt  keeps  growing,  as  shown  in  figure 
3.  As  long  as  the  nation  runs  current  account  deficits,  the  debt 
must  grow  (unless  Americans  perpetually  enjoy  much  larger  capital 
gains  on  their  foreign  assets  than  foreigners  have  on  their  U.S. 
assets,  a most  unlikely  situation).  As  a  result  of  the  United 
States  huge  foreign  obligations,  a new  problem  has  emerged:  a 
widening  deficit  in  factor  income  payments  as  more  profits, 
interest,  and  dividends  flow  out  of  American  hands  to  foreigners 
than  flow  in  (figure  4).  Until  recently,  the  United  States' 
current  account  deficit  was  caused  entirely  by  the  excess  of 
merchandise  imports  over  merchandise  exports;  with  the  emergence 
of  the  factor  income  deficit,  the  country  now  has  two  current 
account  problems. 
Wynne  Godley  and  William  Milberg  analyzed  the  implications 
of  continuing  large  current  account  deficits.g  They  concluded 
that  a  continuation  of  current  trends  would  increase  the  net 
’  Godley,  Wynne  and  Milberg,  William.  "US  Trade  Deficits: 
the  Recovery's  Dark  Side,"  Challenqe,  November-December  1994. 
Godley,  Wynne.  "US  Foreign  Trade,  the  Budget  Deficit  and 
Strategic  Policy  Problems:  A  Background  Brief,  The  Jerome  Levy 
Economics  Institute  Workinq  Paper,  No.  138,  April  1995. 
16 outflow  of  factor  income  to  over  1%  of  GDP  by  2000  and  about  2% 
by  2005,  figures  that  now  look  conservative.  These  trends  are 
not  sustainable,  and,  as  the  authors  argued,  the  longer  they  go 
on,  the  greater  the  pressures  for  a plunge  in  the  dollar  and  the 
more  serious  the  domestic  and  international  implications. 
Godleyl'  shows  that  if  the  U.S.  current  account  deficit  is  not 
sharply  reduced,  an  international  currency  crisis  will  become 
virtually  inevitable  --  a  crisis  so  severe  that  it  is  likely  to 
cause  global  deflation. 
Federal  Reserve  policy  has  a direct  impact  on  the  current 
account  deficit  and,  indeed,  is  aggravating  the  problem  in  a 
number  of  ways.  Rising  interest  rates  have  tended  to  delay 
currency  adjustments  that  might  foster  more  balanced  trade. 
Moreover,  interest  rate  hikes  have  increased  the  volume  of 
interest  payments  flowing  from  American  to  foreign  accounts.  One 
may  argue  that  the  Fed  and  other  G7  central  banks  have  also 
delayed  currency  adjustments  by  sporadically  intervening  directly 
in  the  foreign  exchange  markets  in  defense  of  the  dollar, 
although  whether  any  of  these  actions  have  significantly  affected 
exchange  rates  more  than  briefly  is  questionable.  Finally,  by 
maintaining  high  interest  rates  and  inhibiting  growth,  the 
Federal  Reserve  may  be  hindering  capital  investment  and  impeding 
lo  Godley,  Wynne.  "A Critical  Imbalance  in US  Trade:  The  US 
Balance  of  Payments,  International  Indebtedness  and  Economic 
Policy,"  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  Public  Policy  Brief, 
No.  23,  1995  (forthcoming). 
17 American  competitiveness.ll 
Given  our  stubborn  current  account  imbalance,  trying  to  keep 
the  dollar  from  weakening  to  avoid  the  inflationary  impact  of 
higher  import  prices  is  akin  to  avoiding  the  dentist  when  you 
know  you  have  a  cavity.  The  longer  you  wait,  the  more  painful 
the  remedy. 
Monetary  Policy  and  Social  Consequences 
Many  economists  today  talk  about  "full  employment"  when  5.5% 
to  6.5%  of  the  labor  force  is  jobless;  twenty  years  ago  3%  or  4% 
was  the  goal.  The  change  represents  an  increase  in  those 
allegedly  unable  to  productively  contribute  to  the  economy  as 
employees  --  a  rise  in  "structural"  unemployment. 
There  is  evidence  that  chronically  high  unemployment  breeds 
unemployability,  as  well  as  a wide  range  of  social  problems.  If 
the  unemployment  rate  is higher  over  a period  of years,  the 
nation  may  well  experience  more  prevalent  social  problems  such  as 
impoverished  households,  school  drop-outs,  single-parent 
families,  substance  abuse,  gang  membership,  crime,  illiteracy, 
and  cultural  alienation.  When  unemployment  rises  a  little 
nationally,  it  expands  a  lot  more  in  distressed  communities,  and 
11  Except  for  extreme  interest  rate  movements,  rates 
probably  have  little  direct  effect  on  business  capital  investment 
decisions  [See  Fazzari,  Steven.  "The  Investment-Finance  Link: 
Investment  and  U.S.  Fiscal  Policy  in  the  199Os,"  The  Jerome  Levy 
Economics  Institute  Public  Policy  Brief,  No.  9,  1993.1  However, 
by  undermining  residential  construction  outlays  and  otherwise 
slowing  the  economy,  high  rates  reduce  corporate  cash  flow  and 
sales  growth,  two  powerful  influences  on  investment  (ibid.). 
18 social  problems  increase.  Young  adults  emerging  from  these 
environments  are  more  prone  to  remain  outside  the  economy  and 
alienated  from  society.  The  research  and  analysis  in  these  areas 
by  William  Julius  Wilson,  Richard  Freeman  and  Harry  Holzer, 
Robert  Haveman,  Christopher  Jencks,  and  many  others  cast  serious 
doubt  on  the  notion  that  macroeconomic  policies  have  no  social 
consequences.12 
Even  if  one  is  unconcerned  with  the  people  so  excluded  from 
the  economy,  one  should  not  disregard  the  costs  of  the 
disenfranchised  on  all  of  society  such  as  crime,  vandalism, 
higher  insurance  premiums,  increased  security  needs,  and  other 
economic  and  quality  of  life  costs.  At  issue  is  not  whether  the 
government  should  spend  more  money  on  aid  to  the  poor,  but 
whether  the  Fed  should  prevent  the  private  economy  from  providing 
jobs  that  could  keep  more  people  constructively  engaged  in  our 
society. 
Weighing  such  expected  social  outcomes  and  risks  against 
anticipated  improvements  in price  stability  is  too  subjective, 
too  reflective  of  value  judgments,  and  too  important  to  leave  to 
a highly  independent  panel  usually  comprised  of  bankers  and 
economists  -- unless,  of  course,  Americans  wish  to  significantly 
l2  Freeman,  Richard  B.  and  Holzer,  Harry  J.,  eds.  The  Black 
Youth  Employment  Crisis,  Cambridge:  National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research  (1986). 
Haveman,  Robert.  Startinu  Even,  New  York:  Simon  & Schuster 
(1988). 
Jencks,  Christopher  and  Peterson,  Paul  E.,  eds.  The  Urban 
Underclass,  Washington  DC:  The  Brookings  Institution  (1991). 
Wilson,  William  J.  The  Truly  Disadvantaged,  Chicago: 
University  of  Chicago  Press  (1987). 
19 compromise  democracy. 
Monetary  Policy  and  the  Standard  of  Living 
A  disturbing,  often  asserted  objective  of  monetary  policy  is 
to  limit  the  economy's  growth  to  a  "sustainable,"  noninflationary 
pace.  The  Fed  is  supposed  to  act  as  the  highway  patrol, 
enforcing  the  speed  limit  as  the  economy  motors  along  the 
expressway.  A policy  of  fine-tuning  growth  with  monetary  policy 
is  troubling  enough,  but  when  tight-money  advocates  proclaim  that 
the  speed  limit  should  be  2.5%,  the  nation  really  has  a problem. 
A  growth  rate  of  2.5%  annually  is  approximately  what 
occurred  in  the  U.S.  economy  over  the  past  quarter  century.  But 
2.5%  is  not  a permanent  rule.  Economic  growth  is  uneven;  a 
longer  view  of  history  reveals  decade-long  or  multi-decade 
periods  of  vibrant  growth,  extended  depressions,  and  spells  of 
stagnation.  Figure  5 illustrates  the  variations  in  growth  since 
the  inception  of  the  NIPA  data  in  1929. 
The  notion  that  2.5%  is  a maximum,  sustainable  rate  for  the 
economy  assumes  that  the  future  will  be  a  replay  of  the  rather 
dismal  performance  of  the  past  25 years.  It  is  also  what  many 
economists  estimate  for  the  years  ahead  based  on  expected  labor 
force  and  productivity  growth.  However,  labor  force  forecasts 
rely  on  projections  of  labor  force  participation  rates  (which  can 
vary  substantially  with  economic  conditions  and  social  trends), 
immigration  (which  is  also  highly  variable),  and  the  reliability 
of  population  data.  Productivity  growth  varies  from  decade  to 
20 decade  according  to  a variety  of  sociological,  demographic,  and 
economic  trends.  I would  argue  that  growth  over  the  next 
generation  is more  likely  to  average  4%  than  2.5%  as  the  long 
period  of  corporate  downsizing  and  weak  fixed  investment  relative 
to  GDP  evolves  into  a new  era  of  booming  investment  in  new,  more 
efficient  business  capacity.13  But  even  if we  merely  note  the 
uneven  historical  record  and  agree  that  the  growth  potential  is 
uncertain,  do  we  want  the  Fed  to  aggressively  fight  growth 
anytime  the  economy  expands  at  a  rate  faster  than  2.5%? 
Consider  what  would  have  happened  had  the  Federal  Reserve 
limited  growth  to  2.5%  during  1946-1966.  Real  GDP  would  have 
increased  by  a  total  of  only  64%  instead  of  106%.  The  standard 
of  living  of  the  average  American  in  1966  would  have  been 
one-fifth  less  than  it  actually  was.  During  these  years,  the 
average  annual  inflation  was 
assure  0%  inflation  and  2.5% 
about  2%;  had  the  Fed  been  able  to 
growth,  would  the  absence  of  this 
modest  inflation  have  justified  the  lost  purchasing  power?  How 
many  Americans  would  take  a  20%  cut  in  standard  of  living  to 
avoid  2%  inflation? 
Moreover,  interest  rates,  especially  after  adjusting  for 
inflation,  would  have  been  chronically  higher.  Residential 
construction  and  business  investment  would  have  been  weaker, 
productivity  gains  smaller,  and  the  United  States'  position  in 
l3  Levy,  David  A.,  "From  Contained  Depression  to 
Prosperity."  Paper  presented  November  12-13,  1993  at  The  Jerome 
Levy  Economics  Institute  conference,  "Restoring  America's 
Economic  Growth  and  International  Competitiveness." 
21 world  markets  less  dominant.  Unemployment  would  have  been 
higher,  and  the  absorption  into  the  labor  force  of  millions  of 
discharged  veterans  would  have  been  much  slower  and  more 
troublesome.  Federal  deficits  would  have  been  higher,  and  the 
nation's  debt-to-GDP  ratio  would  not  have  dropped  from  a huge 
117%  in  1946  to  34%  by  1966.  Americans,  who  just  a  few  years 
earlier  had  lived  through  the  Great  Depression,  might  well  have 
thrown  out  of  office  the  public  servants  who  allowed  the  Federal 
Reserve  to  perpetuate  high  interest  rates,  high  unemployment,  and 
obstacles  to  business  prosperity. 
In  summary,  reality  glaringly  violates  the  first  requirement 
for  an  independent  central  bank  to  be  consistent  with  democracy: 
narrowness  of  scope.  Monetary  policy  does  not  have  narrow 
consequences,  affecting  only  price  stability  and  the  soundness  of 
the  financial  system.  It  does  indeed  involve  numerous  social 
tradeoffs  concerning  some  of  the  issues  most  important  to  the 
American  people.  It  affects  unemployment,  the  federal  deficit 
and  debt,  the  nation's  deteriorating  international  debt  position, 
social  welfare  and  tranquility,  and  the  standard  of  living. 
What  about  the  second  requirement  for  a highly  independent 
central  bank  to  be  consistent  with  democracy:  "The  central  bank 
has  a  systematic,  objective  method  of  selecting  the  right  policy 
to meet  its  goal  of  a  stable  currency  and  a healthy  financial 
sector."  This  condition  does  not  hold  up  too  well  either. 
Does  the  Federal  Reserve  Know  What  It  is  Doing? 
22 The  Federal  Reserve  does  not  have  a  systematic  and  effective 
method  of  choosing  the  monetary  policies  that  will  attain  its 
goals.  Papadimitriou  and  Wray  (1994)14 retrace  the  history  of 
modern  Fed  intervention  and  observe  that  every  method  tried  or 
seriously  considered  --  targeting  Ml,  M2,  M3,  P-star,  gold  and  so 
on  -- has  turned  out  to  have  serious  problems,  leaving  the  Fed, 
in  the  candid  words  of  Governor  Lawrence  B.  Lindsey,  to  "look 
a whole  raft  of  variables  -- we  ignore  nothing  and  focus  on 
nothing.  “15  Yet  it  is  advantageous  for  the  Fed  to  provide  a 
rationale  for  its  actions  to  Congress,  and  Chairman  Greenspan 
emphasized  real  interest  rate  targets  in  1994.  Papadimitriou 
at 
and 
Wray  apply  Mr.  Greenspan's  suggested  rule  in  their  paper  and  find 
that  it  produces  notably  poor  policy  decisions. 
The  explanations  and  rationalizations  of  monetary  policy 
sometimes  become  so  esoteric  that  it  is  tempting  to  ignore  them 
and  just  look  at  the  record.  Figure  6 shows  the  federal  funds 
rate  with  the  shaded  areas  indicating  recessions.  If  one  knew 
nothing  about  the  rationale  for  monetary  policy  and  had  to  guess 
how  decisions  are  made  based  on  this  chart,  he  would  say  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  begins  raising  interest  rates  after  an  expansion 
is  underway  and  keeps  on  raising  them  until  the  economy  gets  into 
l4  Papadimitriou,  Dimitri  and  Wray,  L.  Randall.  "Monetary 
Policy  Uncovered:  Flying  Blind:  the  Federal  Reserve's  Experiment 
with  Unobservables,  "The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  Public 
Policy  Brief,  No.  14,  1994. 
l5  Bradsher,  Keith.  "Bigger  Role  For  Intuition  Seen  at  Fed," 
The  New  York  Times,  28  February  1994. 
23 serious  trouble,  and  then  it  cuts  rates.  Serious  trouble  usually 
has  meant  a  recession,  although  occasionally  the  economy  has  only 
slowed,  as  during  the  so-called  "growth  recession"  of  1967  and 
"rolling  recessions"  of  1984-1986. 
Neither  this  record  nor  the  absence  of  a  consistent  method 
in  Federal  Reserve  policy  decisions  inspires  confidence  that  the 
central  bank  can  manage  inflation  without  causing  or  aggravating 
numerous  problems. 
Special  Risks  in  1995-1996 
The  weakening  of  the  economy  in  1995  highlights  the  problems 
of  giving  the  Fed  too  much  freedom  and  too  narrow  an  objective. 
The  economy  has  deteriorated  in  1995;  whether  the  result  will  be 
a  recession  or  merely  a worrisome  near  miss,  one  cannot  help 
questioning  the  wisdom  of  the  Federal  Reserve's  doubling  of 
short-term  interest  rates  in  1994  and  early  this  year.  Higher 
interest  rates  have  substantially  aggravated  the  deficit  outlook 
for  1996  and  beyond. 
Congress  and  the  President  are  struggling  to  design  a budget 
that  cuts  the  deficit  in  1996  and  eliminates  it  in  seven  to  ten 
years.  Federal  interest  payments  have  recently  been  larger  than 
the  Treasury's  shortfall.  Had  the  Federal  Reserve  not  raised 
interest  rates  in  1994  and  early  1995,  the  saving  in  fiscal  1996 
federal  interest  payments  alone  would  exceed  the  $27.4  billion  in 
cuts  called  for  in  the  Congressional  Budget  Resolution  of  June 
26,  1995.  After  taking  into  account  revenue  losses  and  other 
24 indirect  effects  of  higher  interest  rates  on  the  deficit,  the 
1996  deficit  could  have  been  considerably  smaller  without  cutting 
a  single  program! 
It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  discuss  fiscal 
strategy,  so  let  us  assume  that  the  country  will  pursue  a 
balanced  budget  by  2002.  How  many  student  loans,  defense 
purchases,  state  and  local  grants,  or  Medicare  benefits  are  we 
willing  to  sacrifice  for  each  25  basis  points  of  "inflation 
fighting"  by  the  central  bank?  Ought  not  our  elected 
representatives  to  have  a  large  say  in  the  decision? 
Today's  fragile  international  economic  environment  should 
make  Americans  especially  wary  of  Federal  Reserve  gambles  with 
the  economy  in  a  clumsy  and  perhaps  unnecessary  pursuit  of  price 
stability.  The  global  economy  of  the  middle  1990s  is  fraught 
with  profound  financial  and  economic  problems:  Canada,  Mexico, 
Argentina,  Japan,  most  of  Western  Europe,  Eastern  Europe,  and 
Russia  are  all  experiencing  high  unemployment,  severe  financial 
crises  or  economic  declines  deep  enough  to  threaten  social  and 
political  instability.  Simultaneous  tightening  of  fiscal 
policies  in most  of  the  industrialized  world  will  put  the  global 
economy  to  a difficult  test.  Should  the  Federal  Reserve,  the 
Bundesbank,  and  other  central  banks  be  allowed  to  fight  inflation 
with  little  or  no  responsibility  for  all  the  other  consequences 
of  their  actions  and  with  no  overseeing  representative  of  the 
people? 
The  political  and  economic  circumstances  of  the  1990s  ought 
25 to  flash  a  clear  warning  signal  to  those  who  would  further 
liberate  central  banks  from  responsibility  for  their  actions. 
Ironically,  political  momentum  in  the  United  States  is moving 
toward  granting  the  Federal  Reserve  greater  freedom  and  reducing 
its  accountability  as  evidenced  by  growing  calls  in  Congress  to 
amend  or  abolish  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act,  which  contains  a 
provision  that  requires  the  Federal  Reserve  to work  toward  a  4% 
unemployment  rate. 
Keeping  Central  Banking  In  Perspective 
Preventing  inflation  is  a  legitimate  concern  for  the  United 
States,  as  anyone  living  on  a  fixed  income  during  the  1970s  could 
testify.  Inflation  redistributes  income  in  an  arbitrary  and 
often  unfair  manner.  It hurts  retirees  and  other  pensioners.  It 
obfuscates  fairness 
business  decisions. 
in pay  negotiations  and  adds  uncertainty  to 
It  also  distorts  tax  policy,  makes  financing 
and  owning  a home  more  speculative  and  risky,  destabilizes 
currency  markets,  and  generally  discourages  activity  by  creating 
uncertainty  about  future  inflation,  interest  rates,  exchange 
rates,  and  asset  values. 
Nevertheless,  American  policymakers  are  gripped  by  a  fear  of 
inflation  that  is  far  out  of  proportion  to  the  dangers.  Since 
the  late  194Os,  America  has  experienced  serious,  noncyclical 
peacetime  inflation  only  from  1973-1981.  Nevertheless,  that 
experience  generated  a  fear  of  inflation  that  leads  to  widespread 
concern  that  the  nation  is  embarking  on  a new  period  of  seriously 
26 accelerating  prices  every  time  the  pace  of  price  gains 
experiences  a  cyclical  increase.  The  record  of  postwar 
inflation  (figure  7)  illustrates  that  not  every  wiggle  portends  a 
new  inflationary  or  disinflationary  trend. 
Moreover,  there  are  good  reasons  to  expect  prices  to  remain 
well  behaved  in  the  1990s.  First,  labor  cost  increases  have  been 
and  are  likely  to  remain  small.  The  United  States  has  regained 
what  it  lost  in  the  late  1960s  and  197Os,  a  culture  of  wage 
stability,  which  is  reflected  in  the  employment  cost  index 
(figure  8).  The  current  business-labor  culture  stresses  price 
stability  and  pay  related  to  productivity.  Most  firms  have  great 
difficulty  in passing  along  higher  costs  to  their  customers 
because  of  keen  competition  from  domestic  and  often  foreign 
companies,  and  workers  are  more  aware  than  they  have  been  in 
years  that  their  jobs  depend  on  the  competitiveness  of  their 
employers.  Firms  have  institutionalized  cost-reduction  goals  in 
every  area  from  purchasing  to  production  to  sales,  and  managers 
who  have  gone  through  the  painful  experience  of  shedding 
employees  are  loath  to  become  loose  with  their  budgets  again. 
Capacity  utilization  data,  which,  according  to  many  economists  in 
the  financial  sector,  the  press,  and  in  government,  indicated  the 
imminence  of  inflationary  bottlenecks  earlier  this  year  in  fact 
seriously  understate  the  production  potential  of  U.S. 
manufacturers.  Moreover,  the  capacity  utilization  rate  has 
fallen  this  year,  and  idle  capacity  is vast  overseas. 
Taking  a  longer  view,  America  will  undoubtedly  be  challenged 
27 with  rising  commodity  prices  and  other  inflationary  shocks,  but 
these  will  not  necessarily  lead  to  prolonged  increases  in 
inflation.  Nor  will  viciously  tight  money  necessarily  be  the  key 
to  preventing  inflation  from  acquiring  momentum. 
That  chronic  monetary  drag  and  restrained  growth  are 
necessary  to  keep  inflation  under  control  is  often  taken  for 
granted.  Yet  in  Japan,  the  country  most  noted  for  growth  and  low 
unemployment  in  the  postwar  era,  inflation  has  been  modest 
(figure  9).  The  inflation  rate  exhibited  considerable  cyclical 
movement  and  miscellaneous  fluctuations,  but  its  trend  remained 
subdued.  Even  the  oil  shocks  of  the  1970s  did  not  have  long-term 
effects.  And  Japan  did  not  rely  on  high  unemployment  or 
extraordinary  interest  rates  to  keep  inflation  in  check. 
Inflation  is  not  so  great  or  obvious  a danger  that  Americans 
should  be  willing  to  undermine  their  democracy  by  giving  the 
Federal  Reserve  more  independence.  Nor  is  it  clear  that  doing  so 
would  improve  economic  performance.  On  the  contrary,  the  Fed 
should  be  held  more  closely  accountable  for  its  actions. 
Congress  should  reject  the  arguments  of  those  who  would  exclude 
unemployment  from  the  monetary  policy  debate.  It  should  also 
insist  on  the  inclusion  of  numerous  other  important  issues  in  the 
monetary  policy  debate:  the  national  debt,  the  nation's 
international  indebtedness,  U.S.  competitiveness,  the  standard  of 
living,  social  stability,  the  quality  of  life,  and  a broader 
consideration  of  what  constitutes  an  inflation  threat  and  what 
alternatives  might  exist  to  chronic  monetary  drag.  Finally, 
28 Congress  must  take  the  Federal  Reserve  to  task  for  aggravating 
problems  in  all  areas  affected  by  monetary  policy.  More 
independence  for  the  Federal  Reserve  is  about  the  last  thing  the 









































































































































































































VFigure  6.  Federal  Funds  Rate 
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